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RECENT DECISIONS
Constitutional Law-PREJUDGMENT SELF-HELP REPOSSESSION OF SECURED
PROPERTY HELD NOT To VIOLATE DUE PROCESs-Adams v. Southern Cali-
fornia First National Bank, No. 72-1484 (9th Cir., Oct. 4, 1973).
The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution guaran-
tees that no state shall deprive any person of property without due process
of law.' Whenever a state is directly involved in the prejudgment reposses-
sion of secured property, the debtor's due process rights are clearly vio-
lated.2 But creditors have awaited judicial determinations defining state
involvement. The states' Uniform Commercial Code statutes allow private
repossessions of secured property without giving the defaulting debtor
prior notice or the opportunity for a hearing.' There is disagreement over
whether such explicit authorization by state statutes constitutes sufficient
state involvement to be in violation of the fourteenth amendment.'
Statutes allowing state assistance in prejudgment repossessions have
been challenged as violative of due process, based on state involvement. 5
1. Action taken under color of state law depriving any person of his due process rights is
subject to the fourteenth amendment:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1'.
2. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 96-97 (1972).
3. The Uniform Commercial Code as promulgated by the American Law Institute and the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, at section 9-503 adopts the
common law practice of self-help through prejudgment repossession. Section 9-503 provides
in part:
Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take possession of
the collateral. In taking possession a secured party may proceed without judicial pro-
cess if this can be done without breach of the peace or may proceed by action.
Section 9-504 allows for the disposal of the secured property after default and provides in part:
(1) A secured party after default may sell, lease or otherwise dispose of any or all of
the collateral in its then condition or following any commercially reasonable prepara-
tion or processing. ...
(2) If the security interest secures an indebtedness, the secured party must account to
the debtor for any surplus, and, unless otherwise agreed, the debtor is liable for any
deficiency.
4. The argument posed by a defaulting debtor who has had his property repossessed is that
his state's Commercial Code at § 9-503 allowed the repossession and therefore the creditor
acted under color of state law. The debtor then uses this state involvement to bring in the
fourteenth amendment. See note 9 infra.
5. Various state replevin laws provided for state assistance where the creditor decided
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The United States Supreme Court in Fuentes v. Shevin responded by
declaring the Florida and Pennsylvania replevin laws unconstitutional for
providing state aid in prejudgment repossessions7 and held that state ac-
tion depriving any person of the right to notice or a hearing before reposses-
sion of his property is a violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. But state action was not clearly defined. Those questions
dealing with the constitutionality of private actions taken without state
participation remained unanswered by the Court in Fuentes.' Disputes
arose before and after Fuentes in which debtors argued that the state
action contemplated by the fourteenth amendment is not limited to those
against self-help or where a breach of the peace seemed probable. It was contended that where
the creditor elected to ask for and received state aid, the debtor was to be afforded his due
process rights. If judgment was obtained before repossession of the property then the debtor
was afforded his rights. But the usual situation involved the creditor applying for a writ of
replevin and upon issuance the sheriff would repossess the property. In this situation the
debtor's due process rights were violated because he lost his property before a hearing was
conducted. When a creditor recovered the entire amount owed him by sale of the property,
he had no need to go to the courts. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
6. In most states the action is replevin, but in Virginia the proper action is detinue. See,
e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8-586 et seq. (Repl. Vol. 1957), as amended, (Cum. Supp. 1973); Lloyd
v. Federal Motor Truck Co., 168 Va. 72, 190 S.E. 257 (1937).
Virginia law prior to the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code provided various
procedures to be followed depending upon whether the property was retaken by peaceful
repossession or through judicial proceedings. See Snead, Retail Installment Sales: Virginia
Remedies on Default, 16 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1 (1959).
7. In Florida, replevin actions lie whenever goods have been wrongfully detained. The
person seeking relief files a bond for double the value of the property. The writ is issued
provided the plaintiff agrees to prosecute the action in court without delay. Once the sheriff
seizes the property, the defendant has three days to file a bond of equal value in order to have
his property returned. The Pennsylvania procedure is similar except that no court action is
required. The debtor either commences court action himself if he wishes to litigate the matter,
or he files a counterbond for return of the property. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 78.01 et seq. (Supp.
1972-73); PA. R. Civ. P. 1037(a), 1073 et seq. (1967).
8. The deprivations in Fuentes v. Shevin were accomplished by sheriffs who repossessed
the property under authority of court issued writs. Therefore, state involvement was obvious
and the issue of state action never arose. This left the future of self-help actions uncertain
because the Court did not consider the constitutionality of private actions taken without state
participation.
Since the United States Supreme Court announced its decision in Sniadach v. Family Fin.
Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969), all types of prejudgment remedies have been challenged. In
Sniadach the Court found a Wisconsin statute, which allowed wage garnishment without
prior notice or hearing, to be in violation of the fourteenth amendment. This decision left
many questions unanswered. See Clark & Landers, Sniadach, Fuentes and Beyond: The
Creditor Meets the Constitution, 59 VA. L. REv. 355, 357-59 (1973). Some courts proceeded
to apply the rule to all summary creditor remedies, while other courts felt that it was re-
stricted to wage garnishment.
For a comprehensive list of cases see Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 72 n.5 (1972); Adams
v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614, 618-19 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
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cases of active state participation. They contended that the mere adoption
of Uniform Commercial Code § 9-503, which allows private prejudgment
self-help repossessions, is sufficient state action to violate due process.
However, the majority of state and federal courts that have considered this
point have disagreed with this contention.'
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Adams v.
First National Bank' recently passed on the constitutionality of Califor-
nia's Commercial Code sections 9503 and 9504."1 The court considered
whether repossession of motor vehicles by self-help,' 2 as authorized by
sections 9503 and 9504, is an act under color of state law and therefore"state action" within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment.'3 The
plaintiff in Adams'4 borrowed one thousand dollars from the Bank of La
9. The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia is in agreement
with these decisions. See Greene v. First Nat'l Exch. Bank, 348 F. Supp. 672 (W.D. Va. 1972).
See Baker v. Keeble, 362 F. Supp. 355 (M.D. Ala. 1973); Nicholas v. Tower Grove Bank,
362 F. Supp. 374 (E.D. Mo. 1973); Shelton v. General Elec. Credit Corp., 359 F. Supp. 1079
(M.D. Ga. 1973); Shirley v. State Nat'l Bank, No. 15,319 (D. Conn., April 2, 1973); Colvin
v. Avco Fin. Serv. Inc., No. 35-72 (D. Utah, Jan. 4, 1973; Pease v. Havelock Nat'l Bank, 351
F. Supp. 118 (D. Neb. 1972); Kirksey v. Theilig, 351 F. Supp. 727 (D. Colo. 1972); Oller v.
Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972); McCormick v. First Nat'l Bank, 322 F.
Supp. 604 (S.D. Fla. 1971); Weaver v. O'Meara Motor Co., 452 P.2d 87 (Alas. 1969); Giglio
v. Bank of Delaware, __ Del. Ch. _, 307 A.2d 816 (1973); Northside Motors, Inc. v.
Brinkley, 282 So. 2d 617 (Fla. 1973); Messenger v. Sandy Motors, Inc., 121 N.J. Super. 1,
295 A.2d 402 (1972); Brown v. United States Nat'l Bank, - Ore. -, 509 P.2d 442 (1973);
Plante v. Industrial Nat'l Bank, No. 73-714 (R.I. Super. Ct., April 4, 1973). Contra, James
v. Pinnix, No. 72.J-250(N) (S.D. Miss., Feb. 14, 1973); Michel v. Rex-Noreco, Inc., No. 6729
(D. Vt., Nov. 1, 1972); Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
10. CCH SEC. TRANS. GUIDE 52,216 (9th Cir., Oct. 4, 1973).
11. CAL. COM. CODE ANN. § 9503 (West 1964) and VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9-503 (Added Vol.
1965) are identical to UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-503, note 3 supra. CAL. COM. CODE ANN.
§ 9504 (West 1964) and VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9-504 (Cum. Supp. 1973) are identical to UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-504, note 3 supra.
12. Self-help repossession is a long-standing practice which developed under the common
law. Thirteenth century English law prohibited self-help because it usually resulted in force.
The law slowly developed to the point where self-help was allowed if it could be accomplished
without a breach of the peace. Buyer and seller agreed by contract that if the buyer defaulted,
the seller would have the right to repossess the property wherever he could find it so long as
there was no breach of the peace. See 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 278-87
(1923); L. JONES, THE LAW OF CHATTEL MORTGAGES AND CONDITIONAL SALES §§ 1337-39 (6th
ed. 1933); T. PLUCKNE'r, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW, 383 (1956); 2 F. POLLACK
& F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 574-78 (1968).
Virginia recognized peaceful repossession long before section 9-503 of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code was adopted in Virginia. See Universal Credit Co. v. Taylor, 164 Va. 624, 630-31,
180 S.E. 277, 280 (1935).
13. It is important to remember that self-help repossession per se is not being challenged,
but rather self-help repossession by private parties without prior notice or the opportunity
for a hearing.
14. The court actually heard appeals from two district courts which reached different
1974]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
Jolla and executed a promissory note and a security agreement in favor of
the bank. The Southern California First National Bank became the succes-
sor in interest to the Bank of La Jolla, and after the plaintiff's default,
repossessed and sold two of three vehicles securing the agreement. 5 There-
after, Adams filed suit asserting that he had not been given prior notice
or the opportunity for a hearing and asked for damages and declaratory
relief. Finding state involvement through section 9503, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of California decided that the
plaintiff's due process rights had been violated and granted him summary
judgment. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit re-
versed the lower court's holding.' 6
The circuit court agreed with the district court that the fourteenth
amendment applies in those cases where there is a deprivation under color
of state law. 7 But it stressed that the test for color of state law "is not state
results. In the District Court for the Southern District of California, Adams v. Egley (Egley
was a private repossessor hired by the Southern California First National Bank) was consoli-
dated with Posadas v. Star & Crescent Fed. Credit Union. Upon similar facts the district
court granted both plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment. In the District Court for the
Northern District of California, the court reached an opposite result in Hampton v. Bank of
California by dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit heard appeals from the consolidated
cases in the Southern District and an appeal from the cases in the Northern District. All three
cases were considered in Adams v. First Nat'l Bank, CCH SEC. TRANs. GUIDE 52,216 (9th
Cir., Oct. 4, 1973).
The facts in all three cases are similar and involve prejudgment self-help repossessions of
motor vehicles by private persons. In order to avoid confusion, Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp.
614 (S.D. Cal. 1972), will be used as the factual basis for further discussion.
15. The terms of the security agreement were as follows:
Should Debtor fail to make payment of any part of the principal or interest, as pro-
vided in said promissory note . . . the whole principal sum unpaid upon said promis-
sory note with interest accrued thereon, . . . shall immediately become due and paya-
ble at the option of the Secured Party. Upon the occurrence of any such event of default
Secured Party shall have all of the rights and remedies of a Secured Party under the
California Uniform Commercial Code, or any other applicable law, and all rights and
remedies shall, to the extent permitted by law, be cumulative. Without limiting the
generality of the foregoing, upon the occurrence of any such event of default the
Secured Party is entitled to take possession of the vehicle and to take such other
measures as Secured Party may deem necessary for the protection of the vehicles. ...
CCH SEC. TRANS. GUIDE 52,216 at 67,307.
16. The court reversed Adams and affirmed Hampton (see note 14 supra) stating that the
proper ground for dismissal of Hampton was in fact failure to state a federal cause of action
and not lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 67,316 (2-1 decision).
17. The trial judge found sufficient state involvement under color of state law to raise a
federal question under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) and its jurisdictional
counterpart 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970). CCH SEC. TRANS. GUIDE 52,216 at 67,307; Adams
v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614, 617-18 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 states:
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involvement, but rather is significant state involvement.""8 The court re-
quired a showing of state participation in, or regulation of, the private
actions." In Adams the property was seized by private creditors without
state help.2 The plaintiff argued that the private action was carried out
under a state statute with sufficient state control to violate the fourteenth
amendment. The dissenting judge agreed,2' but the majority did not find
either active state participation or state control.22
The plaintiff argued state involvement based on four grounds. He con-
tended that the state regulated private repossession through its statutes
by allowing the prejudgment self-help procedure, restricting disposal of the
property, providing for deficiency proceedings, licensing the repossessor,
and clearing titles to repossessed vehicles.Y The court responded that
many statutes and laws regulate purely private activity, but there must
be some relationship between the state and the individual or some benefit
passing between them in order to find significant state involvement. 4 Sec-
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
The Adams court stated that it is not perfectly clear whether the test used in equal protec-
tion cases applies to due process cases, but the "under color of law" test has been treated as
the equivalent of the state action requirement of the fourteenth amendment. CCH SEC.
TRANs. GUIDE 52,216 at 67,309. See United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794-95 n.7 (1966).
But cf. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 188 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring and
dissenting).
18. CCH SEC. TRANS. GUIDE 52,216 at 67,310 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
19. The Adams court required that a particular relationship or benefit pass as the test for
significant state involvement. Id. at 67,310. For similar tests see Burton v. Wilmington Park-
ing Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 724 (1961); Giglio v. Bank of Delaware,__ Del. Ch. - , 307 A.2d
816, 819 (1973).
Greene v. First Nat'l Exch. Bank, 348 F. Supp. 672, 675 (W.D. Va. 1972), requires "active
and direct" state action, stating that "passive state action is not violative of due process."
20. The court cited Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 173 (1972), in which the
United States Supreme Court stated that private actions are not controlled by the fourteenth
amendment unless there is significant state involvement. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
21. CCH SEC. TRANs. GUIDE $ 52,216 at 67,316-17.
22. Id. at 67,309.
23. The plaintiff contended that the state had complete control over every aspect of the
private repossession. That it, in effect, authorized, regulated, and encouraged the procedures
used. Id. at 67,308-09.
24. The court felt that following the plaintiff's arguments, state involvement could be
traced to all private contractual relationships or even gifts between individuals. Id. at 67,310.
See Colvin v. Avco Fin. Serv., Inc., No. 35-72 (D. Utah, Jan. 4, 1973); Kirksey v. Theilig,
351 F. Supp. 727 (D. Colo. 1972); Oller v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
See also note 19 supra.
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ondly, the plaintiff contended that California's Commercial Code Sections
9503 and 9504 encourage prejudgment self-help by adopting this practice
in the statutes.2? The court found that mere adoption does not encourage
the practice; otherwise every statute that codifies a common law practice
would "cast the shadow of state action over all activity" and bring all
individual wrongs under color of state law merely because a state statute
adopted such practice.26 Thirdly, the plaintiff contended that the creditor
was carrying out a public function in that repossession is normally per-
formed by the state.2 7 The court responded that repossession has been
traditionally a private remedy agreed upon by the parties and not a power
delegated to the creditor by the state.2" Lastly, the plaintiff argued that
the particular security agreement used, referred to and incorporated Sec-
tions 9503 and 9504 and "any other applicable law" and therefore the
creditors acted "with knowledge of and pursuant to" the state law.29 The
court agreed but stated that this knowledge alone was not sufficient to
argue significant state involvement.
The plaintiff relied primarily on Reitman v. Mulkey3' in which the
United States Supreme Court found a California constitutional amend-
ment to be unconstitutional for significantly involving the state in private
racial discrimination.3 2 The Adams court found that Reitman was not con-
trolling.33 In Adams the bank was not an agency of the state, no state
official aided in the repossession, and the repossession was not commanded
by statute.31 The action taken was purely private, based on contractual
25. CCH SEC. TRANS. GUIDE 52,216 at 67,309.
26. The fact that § 9-503 offers a choice between private action and state action is strong
argument that the state legislature did not intend to encourage the use of one procedure over
the other. Id. at 67,310. For the specific language of § 9-503 see note 3 supra.
27. Id. at 67,309.
28. Id. at 67,315.
29. Id. at 67,310. For the specific language of the security agreement see note 15 supra.
30. Id. at 67,310. See notes 18 and 19 and text supra.
31. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
32. The amendment prohibited limitations on an individual's right to rent or sell his real
property. Id. at 381.
33. CCH SEC. TRANS. GUIDE 52,216 at 67,312. The majority in Adams said that Reitman
was distinguishable for at least two reasons. First, the state in Reitman was involved to a far
greater degree because the amendment approved what had been previously prohibited. The
Uniform Commercial Code sections in Adams merely codified existing law, they did not
reverse the law. Second, self-help is based on economic motivation and not on the circumven-
tion of constitutional rights which is the intent in racial discrimination cases. The majority
felt that a case involving racial discrimination could not control the outcome of a case
involving prejudgment self-help repossession of secured property. For a comprehensive list
of cases in which other courts are in agreement see CCH SEC. TRANS. GUIDE 52,216 at 67,312
n.22.
34. The court in Oller v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21, 23 (N.D. Cal. 1972), used
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agreement. The fact that the bank acted within the law of the state does
not involve the state in the action. The private repossession was not cou-
pled with significant state involvement; therefore, due process was not an
issue.35
The decision in Adams provides an element of continuity in the law of
prejudgment repossession of secured property by holding that private ac-
tions pursuant to and with the knowledge of state statutes allowing such
actions are not under color of state law.36 Where private individuals employ
self-help based on a contractual agreement and without explicit aid from
the state, there is no significant state involvement by reason of a statute
allowing such action. To date, Adams is the only federal circuit court
decision on this point, but the majority of state and lower federal court
decisions are in agreement. 7 It is important in credit transactions that the
creditor be able to protect his security upon the debtor's default. Prejudg-
ment repossession is a frequently used protective measure. To strengthen
the private agreement, it is suggested that the controlling credit instru-
ment specifically state that the creditor can repossess on default of the
debtor without notice or a hearing s On appeal, it is doubtful that the
United States Supreme Court would find this practice to be unconstitu-
tional when based upon a statute which does not require or control the
challenged repossessions.
W.R.H.
similar tests to determine if private actions had been extended to include significant state
involvement.
35. The court recognized that there are many situations where private actions are coupled
with state involvement. Each case must be examined individually to see if such involvement
exists. State involvement has been found in situations where symbiotic relationships existed
between the state and private party; where there was an extensive system of state regulation;
where private utility companies possessed certain state authorized powers; where the private
party was performing a function normally performed by the state; where some particular
power was delegated by the state to the private individual; where action was taken in concert
with state officials. The Adams court considered and distinguished a long list of cases offered
by the plaintiff but could not find in Adams the significant state involvement required to
bring in the fourteenth amendment. CCH SEC. TRANs. GUIDE 1 52,216 at 67,311-16.
36. Fuentes was not clear on the question of state involvement in private actions. The
United States Supreme Court in Fuentes recognized self-help at common law and seemed to
indicate that private self-help repossessions hold up today. The Adams court interpreted this
as distinguishing private actions from state actions in the self-help area and therefore takes
a stand on the gap left by Fuentes.
37. See note 9 supra.
38. Mr. Justice White in the minority opinion of Fuentes emphasized the importance of
private agreements to protect the creditor's interest. 407 U.S. 67, 102 (1972).
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